On 9 April 2025, the Estonian parliament Riigikogu adopted an amendment to the Churches and Congregations Act, aimed at preventing religious organisations in Estonia from being led by individuals or associations based in foreign states if such ties pose a threat to the security, constitutional or public order of the Estonian Republic.
While the amendment has predominantly been associated with concerns regarding the ecclesiastical structure of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Estonia, its scope is broader. According to the Ministry of the Interior, the legislation seeks to protect Estonia’s democratic values and national security against any terrorist or violent religious organisations that might undermine the constitutional or public order of the Republic of Estonia.[1]
On 24 April, President Alar Karis declined to approve the Act, citing concerns about its constitutionality.[2] The law is currently under debate again in Riigikogu, with Members of Parliament confirming their intention to reintroduce the amendments to the Churches and Congregations Act in June. They have also indicated the willingness to amend certain provisions in light of the President’s critique.[3]
This legislative process has been lengthy and complex, with roots closely linked to the participation of the ROC in Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine.
The Church engaged in politics
Since 2022, an increasingly urgent issue has been the role of the Russian Orthodox Church as the ideological cornerstone of the so-called “Russian World,” and its influence on Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine. Its leadership regards the ongoing conflict as a holy war against the West’s decadence.
Compared to other Western European countries – where Russian Orthodox believers constitute a small minority – the membership of the Orthodox in Estonia is notably substantial (180 000 people, which constitutes 16% of the population), with the majority of the Russian-speaking community being affiliated with the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (EOC-MP), subordinate to the ROC.
Therefore, the influence and role of ROC representatives – particularly in the context of the ongoing conflict – have critical implications for Estonia’s national security, more so than in Western European nations. This has prompted Estonia to scrutinise the issue of the ROC’s presence more closely.
Estonia’s religious legislation is notably liberal. At the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Estonian authorities did not immediately impose restrictions on the ROC’s local structures. Instead, they engaged in dialogue with church representatives over messages from the ROC leadership justifying Russia’s actions in Ukraine.
However, concerns promptly arose regarding the EOC-MP. In January 2022, at a time when Russia had amassed approximately 200,000 troops near Ukraine and placed Europe on the brink of conflict with its demands, the EOC-MP published a special bilingual (in Russian and Estonian) edition of its newspaper, Pravoslavnyi Sobesednik. This issue focused on criticising both the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the actions surrounding the establishment of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in 2019. Many of the articles were based on presentations delivered at the congress titled ”World Orthodoxy: Primacy and Conciliarity in the Light of Orthodox Dogmatic Teaching”, held in Moscow on 16 September 2021.[4]
This fact was highlighted in the 2023 Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service Yearbook with the following remark: “In January, as the Kremlin sought to generate anti-Ukrainian hysteria to create a favourable environment for its military offensive, the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (EOC-MP) published a special issue of its magazine, Pravoslavnyi Sobesednik, containing slanderous and false claims against Ukraine and Estonia.”[5]
The outbreak of war did not immediately lead to caution among leaders of the EOC-MP or the clergy in Estonia, as the activities of the church’s leadership increasingly demonstrated efforts to maintain influence over the Estonian public, especially its Russian-speaking community. For example, the EOC-MP published on their webpage Patriarch Kirill’s speech from 24 February 2022, where he emphasised the unity of Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian peoples, simultaneously denying Ukrainian sovereignty and the right to self-determination.
As a result, public and media pressure to condemn Russian aggression grew in Estonia – so much so that voices from the lay Russian Orthodox community in Estonia also called for a stance against the invasion. On 17th March 2022, Metropolitan Yevgeni, leader of the EOC-MP since 2018, signed an appeal with other members of the Estonian Council of Churches (ECC), condemning Russia’s actions in Ukraine. However, on 30 March, he refused to recognise Russia as the aggressor during an interview.
This behaviour, characterised by controversial statements, appeared to be a recurring pattern for him. In March 2022, Yevgeni stated that he had agreed with the ECC’s stance but left it to others to decide who was to blame for the war and who was the aggressor.
A direct interference in politics took place before Estonian parliamentary elections in March 2023. He together with Aivo Peterson and Oleg Ivanov, two representatives of the NGO “Together” (Koos) released a video on social media, inviting people to a prayer for peace. According to the Ministry of the Interior, the same NGO had repeatedly made pro-Kremlin statements.
After a reaction by Estonian politicians, who said that the residence permit of Yevgeni should be revoked, in case he should cooperate with “Together,”[6] and the Ministry of Interior, who asked for answers about Yevgeni’s political involvement, he decided to withdraw and cancel the prayer.[7] The same kind of interference took place before the elections in Moldova in 2024 when local Russian Orthodox priests lobbied for an anti-European stance.[8]
In the case of Estonia, the authorities and public reaction managed to stop the actions of Metropolitan Yevgeni. Peterson and Ivanov registered the NGO Together as a political party, but on March 11, 2023, Peterson was arrested by the Estonian Internal Security Service on suspicion of treason and thereafter Oleg Ivanov left for Russia.[9]
Consequently, the Estonian public started to demand that the EOC-MP should be terminated. During 2022 and 2023 Yevgeni was on numerous occasions invited to the Ministry of Interior to explain his position in connection with the views of Patriarch Kirill.[10]
In January 2024, the Police and Border Guard Board (PBGB) refused to renew the temporary residence permit of Yevgeny on security grounds. This decision was subsequently appealed by the Metropolitan in court, and in December 2024, the court of first instance upheld the PBGB’s decision.
In April 2024, the Internal Security Service noted in its annual report that Metropolitan Yevgeni had after the death of the late Metropolitan Kornilii in 2018 been nominated by the Patriarchate in Moscow as a candidate for the position of Metropolitan, against a local Estonian candidate. This was facilitated by the administrative ties between the EOC-MP and the ROC, as established in the constitution of the EOC-MP.
Yevgeni’s appointment by Moscow exemplifies how the ROC utilises the EOC-MP to promote its agenda. From the outset, Yevgeni issued “statements supporting the Kremlin’s historical narrative, often aligning with propaganda narratives”.[11] These statements appeared disconnected from religious practice. The Intelligence Service noted that Yevgeni had visited Crimea as early as the spring of 2014, immediately following its annexation by Russia.[12]
Demand to cut ties with the Russian Orthodox Church
The decision not to renew Yevgeni’s residence permit on security grounds did not end the debate within Estonian society regarding the relationship between the local EOC-MP and the ROC.
Shortly before Yevgeni departed from Estonia, Daniel Lepisk – one of the few native Estonians serving within the EOC-MP – was appointed as vicar bishop of the EOC-MP’s Tallinn Diocese (the EOC has two dioceses: Tallinn and Narva). According to the EOC-MP’s constitution, both this selection and appointment required confirmation from Moscow. This way the ROC exerts direct control over the local EOC-MP, as few decisions are made without Moscow’s approval. The consecration took place on 4 February 2024.[13]
After Yevgeni left Estonia on 5th February, Bishop Daniel became the public face of the EOC-MP. Meanwhile, Metropolitan Yevgeni did not resign from his position as Metropolitan, resulting in the church being effectively led from Russia from February 2024 onwards. Bishop Daniel also maintains a direct link with Russia, as his brother is a monk-priest there. Together with several priests, who have openly justified the Russian invasion of Ukraine and blessed soldiers fighting in Ukraine, Daniel’s elder brother, monk-priest Filaret (Lepisk), received the third degree of the Order of Saint Sergius of Radonezh from Patriarch Kirill at the Trinity Lavra of St. Sergius – the most important monastery within the ROC.[14]
On 27th March 2024, a congress of the World Russian People’s Council was held in Moscow, where a statement entitled “The Present and Future of the Russian World” was adopted. Patriarch Kirill in his speech stated: “From a spiritual and moral perspective, the special military operation is a holy war in which Russia and its people, defending the unified spiritual space of Holy Rus’, are fulfilling a ‘holy’ mission –protecting the world from globalism and the Western victory, which has fallen into the hands of Satan.”[15]
The speech sparked concerns among Estonian authorities and the public about the administrative link between the EOC-MP and the ROC. According to the ROC’s constitution, Patriarch Kirill is the spiritual leader of the ROC and head of the Holy Synod, whose statements are communicated to the EOC-MP, with most sermons read in its congregations. Additionally, Yevgeni was leading the EOC-MP from Russia, and the constitution stipulates that all decisions by the EOC-MP’s highest governing body – the church council – must be approved by Moscow. The appointment and election of bishops also required confirmation from Moscow.
Politicians, theologians, and church figures expressed concern about Patriarch Kirill’s statements. The views of Patriarch Kirill were framed not as personal opinions but as the official stance of the head of the church, delivered in sermons or published on the church’s official website. The ROC’s presence in Estonia, lacking a distinct local identity, largely reflects imperialist narratives from the late 19th-century Russification period – including the promotion of the Russian language and culture supremacism.[16]
On 2nd April 2024, Archbishop Urmas Viilma of the Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church (EELC) published an article voicing his personal opinions. He urged the Estonian state to end its approach of viewing the EOC-MP as a “state within a state,” whereby its activities are monitored remotely, with intervention only when key figures are deemed necessary to call to account.[17]
On the same day, representatives of the EOC-MP once again visited the Ministry of the Interior to provide explanations. According to Raivo Küüt, Under-Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior, the church representatives were heard, but it was necessary to verify the validity of their statements. Küüt emphasised that the state should not permit the ideology of the ’Russian World’ to divide Estonia.[18]
On 5 April 2024, the Synod of the EOC-MP declared that it dissociated itself from the statements made by the head of the ROC. On 9 April, bishop Daniel Lepisk held a press conference on this matter for the Estonian press.[19] Bishop Daniel stated that within the EOC-MP, the clergy pray for both the Russian and Ukrainian sides.[20] Even though the constitution of the EOC-MP clearly states a subordination in governing the church, Bishop Daniel claimed that there were no direct links with Moscow in terms of church administration: “If someone thinks that direct orders are being issued from Moscow, then there is no subordination in that form. There is a canonical connection.” He explained that “canonical connection means mutual prayer for one another.”[21]
Minister Lauri Läänemets responded to the EOC-MP Synod’s statement by emphasising that distancing oneself from Patriarch Kirill’s actions was insufficient; the church must formally disassociate from Moscow.[22]
Since April 2024, the termination of the administrative links between the EOC-MP and the ROC has gained increasing media attention in Estonia. Over the last year, the EOC-MP has become more active in presenting its views publicly. The leadership of the ROC and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs have also reiterated their positions, aligning with those of the local church at the international level.[23]
The views of the EOC-MP are also supported and promoted by the ultra-conservative wing of Estonia’s Christian community, the same people, who over the years 2020–2022 criticised COVID-19 restrictions and vaccination policies.[24]
The status of the Alexander Nevsky congregation on Toompea Hill in Tallinn was raised in 2023 as a separate issue. The building, owned by the City of Tallinn, is home to the Nevsky Stauropegial Parish, which is directly subordinate to Patriarch Kirill and located directly opposite the Estonian Parliament. According to its constitution, it serves as the official representation of the Moscow Patriarchate in Estonia.[25]
In April 2024, officials from the Ministry of the Interior began touring Estonia to engage with members of the EOC-MP in discussions concerning the future of the Church and to encourage them to sever ties with the ROC.[26]
Concurrently, the Estonian Parliament (Riigikogu) began discussing a political declaration to declare the ROC as an organisation supporting Russian aggression. The declaration was adopted on 6 May 2024 with 75 votes in favour and 8 against.[27]
It stated that the appeals of the Moscow Patriarchate posed a threat to the security and stability of Estonia and a direct threat to the Estonian public and constitutional order. Riigikogu called on all states and the international community to impede the hostile influence activities of the Moscow Patriarchate. The Parliament stressed that this designation referred specifically to the Moscow Patriarchate as an institution and governing body, and not to individual followers of the Orthodox tradition.[28] On 17 April 2025, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a similar statement.[29]
From April 2024, a key point of debate regarding the ROC has centred on the feasibility of separating local congregations from Moscow. In addition to concerns regarding the EOC-MP increasing attention has been directed towards the Pühtitsa Convent in Eastern Estonia, which, like the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral, falls under the direct jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. On 23 April 2024, Minister Läänemets visited the convent to meet with its leadership. In discussions with Abbess Filareta – appointed to her post by Patriarch Kirill – he clarified that the state’s measures were not directed against Orthodox believers in Estonia but rather against the terrorist regime in Moscow.[30]
Despite the amicable tone of the meeting, just a few days later Abbess Filareta sent a letter to the Estonian Council of Churches in which she refused to withdraw from the jurisdiction of the ROC, describing the monastery’s connection to the ROC as a “tie of blood.” This notion is alien to Orthodox tradition and highlights a historical-cultural linkage between the ROC and its structures in Estonia – an association that serves as a cornerstone in preserving an imperialist identity.
A similar type of historical-cultural connection was referenced by Patriarch Kirill during a sermon delivered on 28 August 2024, although his comments went further. The Patriarch stated that for the ROC, the political borders established after the collapse of the Soviet Union were irrelevant: “Because we are the Church of all Russia, and for me Kyiv, Minsk and other capitals of the republics are important – they are important spiritual centres of a united Holy Rus’.”[31] He continued: “The Russian Church is the only institution that currently unites Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and other countries of the so-called post-Soviet space. That is why such attacks on our Church are taking place – because opponents of preserving the spiritual unity of Holy Rus’ see the Russian Church as the main enemy.”[32]
Following these statements, the Ministry of the Interior declared that the activities of the ROC posed a threat to Estonian security and requested clarification from the EOC-MP regarding the Patriarch’s position.[33] The EOC-MP offered a rather ambiguous interpretation of the concept of Holy Rus’: “For us, the idea of the so-called Holy Rus’ is a purely spiritual or religious-philosophical concept rooted in the Middle Ages.”
The EOC-MP also announced that both the Pühtitsa convent and the EOC-MP had retained legal counsel to represent them in their dispute with the state.[34] This move sparked controversy in Estonian society, as the lawyers were engaged through Yana Toom, a Member of the European Parliament known for previously financing legal expenses for pro-Kremlin individuals deported from Estonia.[35]
Church’s legal action against the state
As a result of the legal team’s activities, the EOC-MP’s public visibility in Estonian media increased significantly. On 3 September 2024, the lawyers representing the Church and the convent filed a lawsuit against the Estonian Parliament concerning its earlier declaration, which identified the ROC as an organisation supporting Russian aggression. The EOC-MP argued that the Parliament’s statement could lead to misleading assumptions about them. To finance the legal proceedings, the EOC-MP launched a public donation campaign.[36]
This was not the only legal action initiated by the Church. The complaint regarding the Riigikogu’s statement eventually reached Estonia’s highest judicial authority – the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court declined to hear the case (a prerogative it holds), stating that the Parliament has the right to issue political declarations, thereby dismissing the complaint.[37]
In December 2024, the Tartu District Court (a court of first instance) rejected Metropolitan Yevgeny’s complaint regarding the non-renewal of his residence permit. This decision has been appealed, and the Administrative Court (second instance) has yet to issue a ruling.
In May 2025, the Tallinn District Court dismissed the EOC-MP’s complaint concerning the state’s decision to terminate its support for the Church through the ECC. The court found that the differential treatment of the EOC-MP, compared to other member churches of the ECC, was justified. The court concluded that the state was under no obligation to support a religious organisation whose leadership posed a security risk. Furthermore, it ruled that the withdrawal of financial support did not constitute a violation of religious freedom, as applying for state funding is a voluntary act.[38]
In autumn 2024, the EOC-MP announced that it continued to reject calls to terminate ties with the ROC, maintaining that the connection was solely canonical and that its activities in Estonia remained independent. The Pühtitsa Convent reiterated its earlier statement from April 2024, declaring that to break away from the ROC would constitute a “canonical crime” – a term also applied to the EOC-MP.
It is important to recall that more than 100 years ago – in 1923 – Pühtitsa convent did leave the ROC and continued its activities under the Orthodox Church of Estonia. Had it not been for the Soviet occupation in 1940, the convent would still belong to that Church.[39]
How to proceed? A vicariate or an “independent” church?
In the spring of 2024, Metropolitan Stefanus of the Orthodox Church of Estonia (OCE) submitted a canonical proposal through the ECC offering a potential solution. He proposed the creation of a vicariate for Russian-speaking parishes within the OCE. This vicariate would be led by a bishop who would commemorate Metropolitan Stefanus, and not Patriarch Kirill, in liturgical services.[40]
On 2 August 2024, Bishop Daniel of the EOC-MP announced that his Church could not accept this proposal, stating that parishioners did not support the idea.[41] This is not the entire truth. In Spring 2024 Nõmme congregation in Tallinn, which has the highest number of native Estonians and an Estonian priest, took a decision to support the independence from the ROC.[42]
Instead of accepting the vicariate, the EOC-MP began drafting amendments to its constitution. On 31 July 2024, Church representatives met once more with officials from the Ministry of the Interior, where the Ministry reiterated its demand that both administrative and canonical ties with the ROC be fully terminated. Both parties agreed to continue seeking a solution collaboratively.[43]
The EOC-MP adopted constitutional amendments in August 2024. References to the ROC were removed from its statutes, and the term “Moscow Patriarchate” was also omitted from the Church’s name. The Church expressed a desire to adopt the name ”Estonian Orthodox Church,” as referenced in the tomos issued by Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow in 1993. The EOC-MP claimed that, through these changes, it had fulfilled the state’s demands and was now administratively independent from the ROC. However, canonical ties were retained, with the Church insisting they were purely religious and not subject to state interference.[44]
In reality, the situation was more complex. The EOC-MP’s statutes continued to refer to the 1993 tomos, which explicitly outlines the Church’s administrative subordination to the ROC and details its internal governance as part of that structure. The Ministry of the Interior therefore regarded the changes as superficial and argued that they did not alter the Church’s actual subordination to the ROC.[45] Nevertheless, the EOC-MP submitted the amended statutes to the court registry for formal approval.
Amending the churches and congregations act
By the summer of 2024, despite increasingly sharp rhetoric from Moscow, the EOC-MP had not terminated its canonical and administrative ties with the ROC.
In September 2024, Ringo Ringvee, Adviser to the Religious Affairs Department at the Ministry of the Interior, noted that the only viable resolution to the situation was for the Estonian branch of the ROC to disassociate itself from its mother Church in Russia. Ringvee recalled that the OCE, with the approval of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, had proposed a canonical solution for the EOC-MP.[46]
As both the EOC-MP and the Pühtitsa Convent maintained that they were unable to unilaterally terminate their subordination to the ROC, the Ministry of the Interior began drafting a legislative amendment to empower the state to terminate such administrative connections if they posed a threat to Estonia’s constitutional order. Minister of the Interior Lauri Läänemets introduced the draft before the Riigikogu on 23 October 2024.[47]
According to the draft, no church, congregation, union of congregations, or monastery may be directed by – or be affiliated by statute with – a foreign individual, institution, or organisation if that entity poses a threat to Estonia’s public or constitutional order, supports military aggression or calls for war, engages in terrorist acts, uses armed force or violence, or acts contrary to the generally recognised principles of international law.
Additionally, under the proposed law, individuals whose actions have been or are directed against the Republic of Estonia and its security, or whose activities may pose a threat to public or constitutional order, would be prohibited from serving on the board of a religious association. Persons, who did not have the right to reside in Estonia would also be barred from such positions.
The initial draft included a provision requiring the termination of doctrinal and confessional ties; however, at the request of the ECC, this clause was removed. The ECC emphasised the importance of maintaining the autonomy of churches, particularly in matters of doctrine and values. The Ministry of the Interior accepted the ECC’s suggestions and revised the draft accordingly in several sections.[48]
On 27 January 2025, the Government of the Republic of Estonia submitted the draft legislation to the Riigikogu. According to the draft, religious associations and societies would be given a two-month deadline to bring their statutes, leadership structures, and operations into compliance with the new legal requirements.[49]The Legal Affairs Committee of the Riigikogu was appointed as the lead committee and organised a public hearing on 18 February 2025. During this session, various parties – including representatives of the EOC-MP – were allowed to express their views.[50]
At the parliamentary hearing, members of the Riigikogu raised concerns about an incident that had occurred the previous day. From the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral – situated opposite the parliament building – nuns from the Pühtitsa Convent had attempted to deliver a petition to the Speaker of the Riigikogu. Several major Estonian media outlets had gathered in the square outside the Riigikogu to photograph the nuns, who stood waiting in freezing conditions. However, the Speaker did not receive them, because no meeting had been arranged.[51]
Members of the Riigikogu expressed frustration that they had not been informed of the nuns’ visit and viewed the media coverage as a coordinated information operation intended to give the impression that the Estonian Parliament was indifferent to the concerns of Orthodox believers.[52]
On 19 February 2025, Minister of the Interior Lauri Läänemets made a formal statement in the Riigikogu concerning the proposed amendment to the Churches and Congregations Act. He stated that the amendment aimed to safeguard religious freedom: “To keep our faith free from hostile, malicious external interference or governance, which could misuse religious associations registered here in any form to interfere in our internal politics through influence operations.”[53]
Meanwhile, the EOC-MP continued the process of registering amendments to its constitution. On 19 September 2024, the EOC-MP applied to the Tartu District Court’s registration department to amend its statutes and change its name to the Estonian Orthodox Church (Eesti Õigeusu Kirik). Their application was declined.[54]
Undeterred, in January 2025 the EOC-MP proposed a new name: Estonian Christian Orthodox Church (Eesti Kristlik Õigeusu Kirik). Once again, the registration department rejected the name on similar grounds. The Church’s legal representatives appealed this decision, and in March 2025 the Tartu District Court ruled in favour of the EOC-MP. According to the court, the new name complied with legal standards, as it was not misleading concerning the purpose, scope, or legal form of the Church’s activities.
The court’s ruling was final and binding on the registration department, which was then obliged to approve the name change. Consequently, the Church was officially registered under its new name: Estonian Christian Orthodox Church. Interestingly, the Church adopted a different form of its name in Russian: Estonian Orthodox Christian Church (Эсто́нская правосла́вная христиа́нская це́рковь).[55]
In March 2025, a government reshuffle took place, during which the Social Democrat Minister of the Interior, Lauri Läänemets, was replaced by Igor Taro of the Liberal Party Estonia 200. While opponents of the amendments had previously portrayed Läänemets’s stance as a socialist opposition against the church, drawing parallels with the Bolsheviks, the government’s overall policy remained unchanged following the change in leadership. Igor Taro, the new Minister of the Interior said that he was well aware of the role the ROC played in the domestic and foreign policy of the Russian Federation.[56]
The Parliamentary debate focused on two main perspectives. Supporters of the bill emphasised national security concerns and viewed the continued link between the local Church and the ROC as problematic, particularly given the rhetoric of the ROC’s leadership, which appeared to frame Estonia as part of the Russian cultural and ideological sphere. Opponents of the bill perceived it as a restriction on religious freedom, arguing that the ROC in Estonia operated independently and had not been formally accused of any wrongdoing.
In response to concerns raised in the media, the Ministry of the Interior firmly denied claims that Russian orthodoxy would be banned in Estonia, that monasteries or congregations would be forcibly closed, or that religious freedom would be curtailed.[57]
Martin Helme, leader of the far-right Estonian Conservative People’s Party, stated on 8 April 2025, ahead of the third reading of the draft legislation, that the adoption of the amendment would lead to riots on the streets. Helme also argued that the amendments constituted a restriction of religious freedom and asserted that a response from the new United States administration, which he claimed was opposed to the persecution of Christians, was imminent. This was yet another political argument used against the amendment to the law.[58]
Objections from the Estonian Christian Orthodox Church (former EOC-MP) also reached the international stage before the adoption of the amendments. Bishop Daniel Lepisk addressed the 58th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, where he argued that, according to the UN’s methodology for the prevention of genocide, targeting groups based on national, ethnic, religious, or other characteristics and inciting hatred against them could lead to grave consequences. Referring directly to this methodology, Lepisk contended that the actions of the Estonian authorities breached international law and risked fuelling societal hatred and human rights violations.
The fact that Lepisk placed his speech in the context of genocide prevention concerning Estonia, and did so in Russian, provoked a sharp reaction in the Estonian press. His remarks – and the broader position of the Estonian Christian Orthodox Church (former EOC-MP) – were supported at the UN by organisations with Russian affiliations and interests.[59]
On 9 April 2025, the Riigikogu adopted the Act on Amendments to the Churches and Congregations Act. Of the 101 members of the Riigikogu, 89 were present; 60 voted in favour of the amendment, 13 opposed it, and 16 abstained.[60] Following the adoption, representatives of the Estonian Christian Orthodox Church (former EOC-MP) and the Pühtitsa Convent appealed to President Alar Karis to veto the decision.
As anticipated, Maria Zakharova, spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, issued a strong condemnation, accusing Estonia of continuing to commit targeted human rights violations.[61]
In the Yearbook of the Estonian Internal Security Service, presented on 14 April 2025, it was revealed that the former EOC-MP subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate had engaged in covert negotiations with Russian partners in 2024 to fund a Russian-language private school in Tallinn. To conceal these activities and channel sanctioned funds into Estonia, the Church had reportedly employed various illicit financial schemes.[62]
On 24 April 2025, President Alar Karis declined to promulgate the law passed by Parliament. While acknowledging that the Moscow Patriarchate poses a threat to state sovereignty and democratic order, the President argued that the wording of the amendment conflicted with Articles 40 (freedom of religion), 48 (freedom of association), and 11 (principle of proportionality) of the Estonian Constitution, because it imposed disproportionate restrictions on religious and associational freedoms. In his written statement, the President emphasised that „the issue is not the lack of legal means, but their use. Existing means should be used more vigorously than before, if necessary.“[63]
The decision was welcomed by both the Estonian Christian Orthodox Church (former EOC-MP) and the Pühtitsa Convent. In response to the President’s objections, both Minister of the Interior Igor Taro and several members of the Riigikogu announced that the President’s concerns would be addressed and that work on the draft legislation would resume promptly.[64]
On 14 May 2025, the Estonian Parliament decided to proceed with the law, incorporating amendments to address the criticisms raised by President Karis. The deadline for submitting proposed amendments was set for 28 May. The revised draft will be reviewed by the Parliament’s Legal Affairs Committee and the Constitutional Committee, before being submitted to the Riigikogu for the second time. Members of Parliament have pledged to finalise and adopt the amended law by the end of June 2025.[65]
On 18 June 2025, after two readings the Parliament with the votes 68 for and 17 against adopted the amendments for the second time. Now the law is back in the hands of President Karis, who, if he rejects it a second time, will send it to the Estonian Supreme Court for a decision, on whether it is constitutional or not. The president has two weeks to either approve or reject the amendments.
Russia’s campaign against Estonia
The Russian Federation has repeatedly demonstrated its intent to use the Orthodox Church as an instrument for maintaining and expanding its influence in Estonia. It employs international organisations and Orthodox Churches that are ideologically aligned with, and financially dependent upon, Moscow to disparage the Estonian state and to allege violations of human rights and religious freedoms.
A recent example is a Kremlin-funded disinformation campaign aimed at discrediting the Estonian Chancellor of Justice, Ülle Madise. A Swiss-based organisation, Justice pour Tous Internationale, which presents itself as a human rights NGO, has filed multiple complaints against Estonia with the United Nations (UN). In May 2025 alone, three complaints were submitted, alleging the persecution of Orthodox Christians in Estonia.
Central to this initiative is Oleg Ivanov, a member of the NGO Together (Koos), who in 2023 attempted to organise a peace prayer event with Metropolitan Yevgeni and subsequently fled to Russia. Ivanov has been involved in soliciting funding from Pravfond – a Russian state-backed foundation that finances activities of Russian expatriates – for Justice pour Tous Internationale.[66] Pravfond’s role in supporting sanctioned Russian individuals and organisations has attracted increasing scrutiny also from Western-European media.[67]
Another noteworthy example concerns the Patriarchate of Jerusalem, which has historically been subject to financial influence and political pressure from Russian ecclesiastical and state authorities. The use of this ancient patriarchate to further Russian geopolitical interests is part of a broader pattern. In November 2019, Patriarch Theophilos of Jerusalem travelled to Moscow to receive an award for promoting Orthodox unity. The visit was orchestrated at a high diplomatic level, including a meeting with President Vladimir Putin.
During his visit, Patriarch Theophilos proposed convening a synod of Orthodox primates to discuss the situation in Ukraine – a significant public relations victory for the ROC.[68] The ROC subsequently declared that the Church of Jerusalem was its strongest ally on the Ukrainian issue, referring to it as the “oldest Christian Church” and the “true Mother Church” – a narrative that sidesteps the canonical hierarchy of the Orthodox world.
Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that on 30 April 2025, the Patriarchate of Jerusalem expressed concern regarding the legislative amendments recently adopted by the Estonian Parliament. On 1 May, Metropolitan Yevgeni, Bishop Daniel Lepisk, and Abbess Filareta of the Pühtitsa Convent visited Patriarch Theophilos in Jerusalem. Following the visit, the Patriarch publicly affirmed his support for the Russian Orthodox community in Estonia. Controversially, in the same statement, he invoked the suffering of Christians not only in Estonia, but also in Gaza, Palestine, Ukraine, and Syria – drawing questionable parallels between these vastly different contexts.
In response, Metropolitan Yevgeni underscored the spiritual authority of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem as the ”Mother of all Churches” and emphasised the Patriarch’s standing within the global Orthodox community.[69]Through this alignment, representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church in Estonia amplified the narrative advanced by both the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian state.
This raises pressing questions about the independence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Estonia. Can it credibly claim to be apolitical and autonomous when its actions so clearly align with the geopolitical aims of the Kremlin?
[1] https://siseministeerium.ee/en/factsheet-amendments-churches-and-congregations-act
[2] https://news.err.ee/1609673975/president-sends-church-foreign-influence-law-back-to-riigikogu
[3] https://news.err.ee/1609682411/riigikogu-debate-on-amending-church-foreign-influence-law-to-start-tuesday
[4] https://www.patriarchia.ru/en/db/text/5843508.html
[5] https://www.valisluureamet.ee/doc/raport/2023-en.pdf
[6] https://www.postimees.ee/7702021/ossinovski-metropoliit-peab-poliitilisest-koostoost-loobuma-voi-tuleks-tuhistada-tema-elamisluba
[7] https://www.err.ee/1608869081/vene-kirik-tuhistas-mtu-koos-vmeste-algatatud-uhispalvuse
[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/minority-wing-moldovan-orthodox-church-accuses-priests-lobbying-against-europe-2024-09-26/
[9] https://www.delfi.ee/artikkel/120156128/kohus-vahistas-aivo-petersoni-ja-kaks-meest-keda-kahtlustatakse-eesti-vabariigi-vastase-suhte-loomises;
https://www.err.ee/1608983237/erakonna-koos-juht-ivanov-lahkus-venemaale-ja-juhib-erakonda-sealt
[10] https://www.err.ee/1608753352/professor-metropoliit-eugeni-vastas-ministeeriumile-nii-nagu-temalt-kusiti
[11] https://kapo.ee/sites/default/files/content_page_attachments/Annual%20review%202023-2024.pdf
[12] https://www.valisluureamet.ee/doc/raport/2019-en.pdf
[13] https://www.meiekirik.net/index.php/uudislood/2496-tallinnas-puehitseti-mpeok-uus-piiskop
[14] https://maailm.postimees.ee/8187485/ak-sojavaesurm-on-koigist-surmadest-parim-kuidas-vene-preestrid-sodivad-saavad-ordeneid-ja-palvetavad-rahu-sailitamise-nimel
[15] https://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6116189.html
[16] https://www.err.ee/1609300785/professor-ei-nae-kuidas-saaks-mpeok-eirata-vene-kiriku-ideoloogiat; https://www.err.ee/1609609880/teoloog-mpeok-lahkumist-moskva-voimu-alt-takistab-nende-ideoloogia; https://www.err.ee/1609650590/harri-tiido-vene-kiriku-ja-voimu-uhtekuuluvusest
[17] https://www.err.ee/1609300095/urmas-viilma-vene-maailma-murgiseeneniidistik-ja-puha-soda
[18] https://www.err.ee/1609300722/kuut-mpeok-vaimulikud-lubasid-hoiduda-patriarh-kirilli-suuniste-taitmisest
[19] https://www.err.ee/1609303464/mpeok-sinod-teatas-enda-distantseerimisest-vene-rahvusliku-kogu-otsustest; https://et.orthodox.ee/messages/mpeok-positsioon-kiriku-ja-riigi-vahelises-kriisiolukorras/
[20] https://www.postimees.ee/7993065/piiskop-daniel-me-palvetame-molema-vaenupoole-eest
[21] https://www.delfi.ee/artikkel/120284065/piiskop-daniel-lepisk-patriarhi-oeldu-peale-kirikut-vahetada-pole-moeldav-inimesed-voivad-eksida
[22] https://www.err.ee/1609304151/siseminister-mpeok-ei-saa-patriarh-kirilli-alluvuses-jatkata
[23] https://www.delfi.ee/artikkel/120285042/venemaal-nimetati-laanemetsa-ettepanekut-moskva-patriarhaat-terroriorganisatsiooniks-kuulutada-vaimuhaiguseks-ja-absurditeatriks
[24] https://meiekirik.net/index.php/art/2839-ainus-kelle-eest-kirik-kaitset-vajab-on-eesti-riik
[25] https://www.err.ee/1609310478/moskva-patriarhaadi-oigeusukirik-rendib-tallinnas-seitset-kinnistut; https://www.err.ee/1609300785/professor-ei-nae-kuidas-saaks-mpeok-eirata-vene-kiriku-ideoloogiat
[26] https://www.err.ee/1609318887/siseministeerium-puuab-moskva-patriarhaadi-kogudusi-veenda-oma-alluvust-muutma
[27] https://www.riigikogu.ee/pressiteated/taiskogu/riigikogu-kuulutas-moskva-patriarhaadi-venemaa-agressiooni-toetavaks-institutsiooniks/
[28] https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/308052024001
[29] https://pace.coe.int/en/files/33511/html
[30] https://www.siseministeerium.ee/uudised/siseminister-puhtitsas-igasugused-sidemed-moskvaga-tuleb-katkestada
[31] https://www.err.ee/1609450310/patriarh-kirill-peab-endisi-liiduvabariike-vaimselt-venemaa-osaks
[32] https://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6154796.html
[33] https://www.err.ee/1609450484/siseministeerium-kirilli-sonad-ohustavad-eesti-julgeolekut
[34] https://www.postimees.ee/8106088/mpeok-vastus-siseministeeriumile-patriarh-kirill-ei-raagi-poliitilistest-moistetest
[35] https://www.err.ee/1609347291/jana-toom-leidis-mpeok-ile-vaidluses-riigiga-advokaadid
[36] https://www.err.ee/1609435999/kuremae-klooster-palkas-advokaadiburoo-sirel-partnerid
[37] https://www.err.ee/1609633634/riigikohus-ei-votnud-mpeok-i-ja-puhtitsa-kloostri-kaebust-menetlusse
[38] https://www.postimees.ee/8249854/riigilt-rahalist-toetust-noudnud-moskvaga-seotud-kirik-jai-kohtus-kaotajaks; https://www.err.ee/1609695081/kohus-leidis-et-eesti-kristliku-oigeusu-kiriku-toetuseta-jatmine-oli-oigusparane
[39] https://www.err.ee/1609507465/kuremae-klooster-valistas-enda-sammud-moskva-patriarhaadi-alt-lahkumiseks; https://www.err.ee/1609476212/iguumenja-filareta-patriarhi-seisukoht-ukraina-sojast-on-tema-isiklik-arvamus
[40] https://www.postimees.ee/8161253/intervjuu-metropoliit-stefanus-lohe-oigeusklike-vahel-on-stalini-ajal-loodud
[41] https://www.postimees.ee/8092238/uurimus-eesti-oigeusu-kirik-ja-moskva-fiktiivne-lahutus-ja-uued-voimalused-kokkukolimiseks
[42] https://www.postimees.ee/8024659/oigeusu-kiriku-alluvus-moskvale-voiks-aasta-lopuks-otsa-saada
[43] https://www.err.ee/1609412149/siseministeerium-ja-mpeok-leppisid-kokku-edasistes-sammudes
[44] https://www.err.ee/1609430782/mpeok-piiskop-teatud-kanoonilised-seosed-moskva-patriarhaadiga-paratamatult-jaavad
[45] https://www.err.ee/1609430512/stefanuse-hinnangul-ei-saa-mpeok-votta-oma-nimeks-eesti-oigeusu-kirik
[46] https://arvamus.postimees.ee/8104198/ringo-ringvee-riik-sekkuda-ei-saa-moskvast-eraldumine-seisab-mpeok-juhtkonna-taga
[47] https://www.delfi.ee/artikkel/120331211/siseminister-lauri-laanemets-tutvustas-riigikogu-ees-uut-eelnou-millega-keelatakse-usuliste-uhenduste-sidemed-soda-toetavate-organisatsioonidega
[48] https://www.delfi.ee/artikkel/120351745/siseministeerium-esitas-valitsusele-kirikute-ja-koguduste-seaduse-muutmise-seaduse-eelnou
[49] https://www.riigikogu.ee/pressiteated/muu-pressiteade-et/menetlusse-voeti-eelnou-kirikute-ja-koguduste-seaduse-muutmiseks/
[50] https://www.riigikogu.ee/pressiteated/oiguskomisjon-et-et/oiguskomisjon-arutab-avalikul-istungil-kirikute-ja-koguduste-eelnou/
[51] https://www.err.ee/1609607741/galerii-puhtitsa-kloostri-nunnad-viisid-riigikogule-palvekirja
[52] https://www.ohtuleht.ee/1124938/palvekirjaga-riigikokku-miks-ei-saanud-nunnad-hussariga-kohtuda-ja-pidid-hanimagiga-leppima
[53] https://siseministeerium.ee/uudised/siseminister-lauri-laanemetsa-kone-riigikogus-19-veebruaril
[54] https://www.delfi.ee/artikkel/120356935/kohus-keeldus-moskva-patriarhaadi-eesti-oigeusu-kiriku-uut-nime-registreerimast-kirik-vaidlustab-otsuse
[55] https://www.delfi.ee/artikkel/120365884/mpeok-sai-kohtus-oiguse-votta-uueks-nimeks-eesti-kristlik-oigeusu-kirik?dsrc=%253D%253DQfiMnYhR3N1UzMlBDO3EjZzYTL4MDOi1yY4ADOtUTZ2YTLmNzMhNzM0YjI6ICZJt2YvxmYiwCM6ICelRmbJ52bpR3YlNnIsIyMxUGc5R1aj9GbCJiOiUGc5R1aj9GbiJCLzojI4VGZul0aj9GbiJCLikmZsVGRiojIl1WYOVGdpNnIsISZnFGc052byZmI6ISZwlHVldWYwJye
[56] https://www.err.ee/1609245162/taro-metropoliidi-valjasaatmine-oli-ootusparane
[57] https://siseministeerium.ee/kirikute-ja-koguduste-seaduse-muudatus
[58] https://www.err.ee/1609658087/martin-helme-siseministeerium-korraldab-uut-pronksiood
[59] https://www.postimees.ee/8216262/piiskop-daniel-raakis-uros-genotsiidi-ohust-eestis-ja-palus-abi
[60] https://news.err.ee/1609659044/estonia-tightens-church-law-to-curb-foreign-influence-protect-national-security
[61] https://news.err.ee/1609661117/russia-criticizes-estonia-s-church-foreign-influence-law
[62] https://www.err.ee/1609663937/kapo-oigeusukirik-peab-venemaaga-varjatud-labiraakimisi-erakooli-rahastamiseks
[63] https://president.ee/et/ametitegevus/otsused/57234-545-kirikute-ja-koguduste-seaduse-muutmise-seaduse-valjakuulutamata-jatmine; https://www.err.ee/1609673972/president-jattis-kirikute-ja-koguduste-seaduse-muutmise-valja-kuulutamata
[64] https://www.siseministeerium.ee/uudised/siseminister-igor-taro-lahtume-oigusloomes-eesti-julgeoleku-tagamise-vajadusest
[65] https://news.err.ee/1609694667/mps-to-change-church-foreign-influence-law-rejected-by-president
[66] https://ekspress.delfi.ee/artikkel/120380478/kremli-salaoperatsioon-inimoiguslased-oonestavad-oiguskantsler-ulle-madise-ja-eesti-riigi-mainet
[67] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/pixels/article/2025/05/22/how-russian-public-fund-pravfond-continued-to-subsidize-its-allies-in-europe-despite-sanctions_6741523_13.html
[68] https://orthodoxtimes.com/patriarch-of-jerusalem-calls-a-primates-assembly/; https://orthochristian.com/126734.html
[69] https://ocpsociety.org/patriarch-of-jerusalem-meets-with-estonian-orthodox-church-delegation-amidst-legal-concerns/
The article picture: Screenshot of the Riigikogu voting result on 18 June 2025. Picture: Priit Rohtmets.
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